Apparently, the warm waters and evaporation may have dissipated up to 40 percent of the surface sheen, and many oil-eating bacteria in the Gulf — due to natural seepage in this specific ecosystem — may have taken care of much of the rest.

And with 4,000 boats skimming the oil and executing controlled burns, the stoppage of the well means a constant reduction of the size of the spill.

The article does raise some concerns about the effect of the oil in the water column and along the sea bottom, but it also notes that the toxic percentage has been measured, and it is very low.

The most critical issue now, it seems, revolves around scaling back the response effort because it employs many fishermen who would otherwise remain jobless. However, even though a third of the Gulf is currently off limits to commercial fishing, it appears that problem will soon vanish as well.

The Food and Drug Administration is now planning to increase testing of the fish so the fishermen can resume their livelihood as well. Good news all around.

But the article is much more “alarming” in its interior details describing the actions, or lack of action, by Transocean, the owner of the rig. BP’s confidential audit of the rig in September showed 390 repairs uncompleted, including many labelled high priority. There were also power losses, computer failures and leaking equipment that was supposed to be waterproof.

And a previous audit by Lloyd’s Register Group showed 26 components in poor working order. All this neglect made the Deepwater Horizon rig an accident waiting to happen. It was not just an unfortunate and unlikely combination of events that caused the Gulf of Mexico oil spill; it was criminal neglect. And that neglect, based on this article, extends to Transocean every bit as much as BP.

Not to leave BP completely off the hook, however. The oil well was running behind schedule, and each day of delay was costing the company $1 million in rental costs for the rig. Workers were obviously pressured to “hurry up,” and haste leads to cutting corners and compounding the situation.

In a survey of workers just before the well blowout, many noted an emphasis on drilling priorities over safety priorities. One worker describes the attitude of Transocean at “Run it, break it, fix it,” and the article noted that the rig had never been in dry dock during its nine years of operation. In fact, 26 components on the rig were found to be in poor condition.

[In other "oil-related" developments, a squall may be moving into the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in temporary removal of the cap on the well. Another potential blow to residents of the area.]

I guess we shouldn’t be surprised at all these revelations, especially when you’re dealing with an unregulated industry and an inherently dangerous task with high profit potential. Still, a company’s most sacred duty is the protection of its employees, and that, at least, represents the most glaring failure of the Deepwater Horizon.

I’m certain there will be more revelations to come. And hopefully, they will spur the clean energy industry in our country at long last.

One disturbing note: there have been some “anomalies” at the sea bottom on the sea floor nearby. They do not indicate oil is leaking through the substrata, a potentially disastrous occurrence because then there would be nothing to do to counteract it.

Meanwhile, the relief well drilled to provide a permanent fix for the problem draws near conclusion, when mud and then cement would permanently halt the gusher.

In other good news, there were no new reports of oil hitting beaches, and skimming ships at the sea’s surface could only find one area to conduct a controlled burn compared to 19 the day before.

This whole event has been a trauma, mostly for Gulf Coast residents, but, in actuality, for the entire nation as we have experienced a rare feeling for Americans, helplessness, as we have watched the oil spew forth. Maybe, it provides a lesson for us about the limits of a can-do approach and the need to be less self-reliant in the future. If I may digress from the general tone of this blog — at these times, many have turned to a higher authority than the federal government and resorted to prayer.

The political deals included agreements with the oil oligarchs in the newly formed Russian confederation after the Soviet Union collapsed, and a contract to help Iraq improve its oil well productivity at a shockingly low $2 per barrel, to the dismay of many of its competitors.

The company was also pushing the envelope in technological innovation, pursuing what the industry called “elephants,” big projects with potentially lucrative returns instead of a smaller, safer ventures. But with boldness comes failure, and the article also chronicles a series of setbacks at Texas City, with the Alaska pipeline, and at another rig in the Gulf called Thunder Horse.

Overall, there is much to admire and detest about this company. It encompasses all the glories and ignomies of the capitalist system, a system that has created more wealth for the average person than any other in the history of the world, while simultaneously exploiting many of those same people. As the saying goes about democracy, it is one of the worst systems except for all the rest.

The blind shear ram is supposed to cut off the pipe to prevent a blowout, but it is vulnerable to “single-point failure” should hydraulic pressure to the valve fail. For this reason, many blowout preventers now carry two blind shear rams in case one fails.

The article also mentions other problems with blind shear rams. Apparently, much more pressure is required to operate them for deep-water operations, and if the blind shear ram tries to cut the pipe at one of its joints, a 10-percent possibility, it is more likely to fail.

Apparently, engineers were aware of some of these problems and, based on prior operation, the failure rate of blind shear rams was estimated at as much as 45 percent.

Even the Mineral Management Service received a suggestion in 2001 that two blind shear rams be required on all rigs because of possibility of failure, and in 2003 received suggestions about an emergency back-up system to activate blowout preventers.

For anyone interested in more technical analysis of the problems in the gulf, this article should be required reading. It extends over two-and-a-half full pages, providing a detailed description of blowout preventers and their components.

Other actions taken by President Obama to save the auto industry, and rein in executive compensation by banks who had been saved from failure by the government, were examined in this light as well. The article concluded by noting the unique rationale for each of these actions but left an ominous tone of a revised interpretation should they continue.

And what would have happened in these cases had President Obama taken no action? Total unmitigated disasters that would have doomed his presidency and left him open for excoriation for dereliction of duty.

These Republicans will stop at nothing to oppose this President. They do not care about helping the people, solving problems or relieving suffering. All they care about is their own recapturing of power. It’s difficult for me to come to any other conclusion. I have tried to take an even-handed, measured analysis of stories, but this conclusion is inevitable. They are trying to manipulate President Obama in such a way that “he’s damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t.” This can not be allowed to continue.

The fund will be administered by a neutral third party, Kenneth Feinberg, who also managed the fund to compensate victims of September 11 as well as asbestos and Agent Orange claims. He also served as pay czar regarding approval of executive compensation and bonuses at the major banks.

The agreement provides pluses for all concerned. The fund will be phased in at $5 billion per year, helping BP to manage its cash flow and removing a lot of uncertainty for investors. In fact, BP stock went up after the announcement.

Even John McCain, one of President Obama’s most visceral critics, agreed it was “a step in the right direction.” President Obama also won another victory, letting BP contribute $100 million “voluntarily” to compensate oil rig workers who experience financial difficulties due to the current six-month moratorium on offshore drilling. BP had previously been adamant about refusing such support.

The only kerfluffle concerned a remark by the Mr. Svanberg about how BP cares about the “small people.” That soon died off as it came from a problem in the translation from Swedish.

These steps include 1) the appointment of Ray Mabus, a former governor of Misssisippi, to create a Gulf restoration plan with local residents; 2) the deployment of 17,000 National Guard troops and his encouragement for their rapid use; 3) the creation of a clean energy policy; 4) the establishment by BP of a fund containing billions of dollars to be administered by a neutral party to pay claims resulting from the oil spill; and 5) the appointment of Michael Bromwich from the Justice Department to restructure the Minerals Management Service.

President Obama outlined some of the details of this policy as well; one of the most interesting ideas was the establishment of efficiency standards for buildings as well as cars.

The speech was a powerful call to action and was the type of address to give people hope after the long nightmare we have been going through during this environmental disaster. Of course, we need to wait to see how these proposals pan out. A key event will be the meeting today between President Obama and BP officials.

After the Exxon Valdez catastrophe, Congress had passed legislation to create detailed plans for reaction to oil spills in the future, the Oil Pollution Act, yet during this spill, the response has been plagued by five different plans with overlapping authority and distrust among the various players. As a result, duplication of efforts often occurred, and people fought with each other in public when they had to cooperate in private.

Requests to response agencies were often ignored for days or weeks; the distribution of containment boom was chaotic; and workers were often sent en masse to areas where they were not needed. The oil spill plan for southeast Louisiana had not been updated for seven years, and many areas showing wetlands are now open water.

There seems to be some progress now after turning the operation over completely to local Coast Guard authorities, but the operation as a whole seems to have been totally inadequate and uncoordinated.